As the Greek economy began its slide into recession, migrants in Greece began to feel a backlash as some political factions tried to turn them into scapegoats for the country’s economic woes. With unemployment hitting eighteen per cent in August, a month when seasonal employment in tourism has always meant a sharp dip in jobless figures, this reaction could become strongers. But are migrants to blame for unemployment or is this just a myth?

In late 2009, and just before Greece plunged into its economic crisis, the number of foreign migrants in Greece was estimated at some 1.3 million. Today, there are indications that about ten per cent of this migrant population has left Greece, while a growing number of foreign migrants are thinking of leaving.

Immigration is a multi-faceted phenomenon. It is a particularly vibrant part of our lives as it has changed our neighborhoods, our natal villages which we visit during the summer, our schools, our cities, our workplace, and even our family life as the care provided by migrant workers has replaced that traditionally offered by grandparents and the extended family. Immigration is a phenomenon that usually complicates social inequalities in host countries, and Greece is no exception to this. In all host countries, immigration has created or intensified class tensions and socioeconomic change while bringing to the fore structural weaknesses in the state apparatus. Often, these resulting changes become entwined with the insecurities fostered among the local population by globalization’s fast pace; immigration thus easily lends itself to politicians and other analysts as the main source of blame for all evils that contemporary societies face–unemployment, social unrest, even religious tension.

In the deepening crisis and insecurity Greece has experience in the last couple of years, immigration has spawned three myths. First, that illegal immigrants take jobs and fuel unemployment. Second, that immigrants are detrimental to the Greek economy and Greek society. And, third, that the issue of illegal migration will be resolved by the economic crisis as conditions will encourage foreign migrants to leave.

Let’s look at the first myth–and its counter, that is, that migrants help create new jobs.

In 2006, when the economy was still experiencing growth and when optimism prevailed, a VPRC public opinion survey found that 56 per cent of Greeks regarded migrants as responsible for the rise in unemployment in Greece. Reality is not as simple. Research such as the Sarris-Zografakis study in 1999 and the Konti-Mitrakos study in 2007 show that overall, immigration had a positive effect on Greek economic growth in the range of 1.5 to 2.8 per cent of GDP. Those who were negatively affected were socioeconomic groups at the lower end of the scale, especially in cities, which faced competition from the cheaper labor offered by migrants. Similarly, the Muslim minority in Thrace which relies on seasonal work in agriculture was also adversely impacted. By contrast, the remaining two-thirds of the population benefited from the availability of cheap labor offered by the migrant influx; indeed, it is estimated that some 20,000 new jobs were created in urban and some 5,000 new jobs were created in rural areas.

Migration had other effects on the Greek labor market. Immigrants filled jobs that the local population had been increasingly unwilling to take. As Greeks improved their financial and educational standards, expectations about work and its prospects had changed; drawing on support from their families, many preferred to wait for a job they felt commensurate with their abilities or aspirations than to take work of lower status and pay. Immigrants also facilitated women’s entry into the job market by providing help in the home such as minding children or the elderly at a relatively low cost.

Finally, migrant labor allowed Greek companies to remain competitive in a global market by helping keep labor costs down. (Of course, the negative side is that cheap migrant labor allowed businesses using old technologies to survive without any incentive to modernize–which in the medium-term emerged as a vulnerability for the Greek economy.)

The second myth–that illegal migration has harmed the economy and society, also has a flip side to it as many argue that illegal migration has had a positive effect on Greece’s economic growth.

An EU funded research project (CLANDESTINO) estimated that in 2008, undocumented migrants numbered between 167,000 and 280,000. By late 2010,such figures had grown significantly across southern Europe, with the number of undocumented migrants in Greece estimated between 330,000 and 440,000.

Most non-legal migrants in Greece enter the country legally, usually on a tourist visa. There are also a number of legal immigrants who are unable to renew their residence permits because they work in the informal economy and therefore cannot provide proof of employment. Unofficial work dominates those sectors employing migrants–construction, tourism, agriculture, and household support. There’s also a segment of the migrant population that enters Greece illegally over land or sea borders with Turkey, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Bulgaria, as well as from northern Africa via sea routes from Egypt.

Greek public opinion is divided over illegal migrants’ impact on the economy: one view focuses solely on the problems created by illegal migration while the other sees migrants as hard-working victims who face racism, xenophobia, and employers’ exploitation.

The reality is more complex. Assuming illegal migrants number up to 440,000, this number embraces several realities–including the presence of criminals, individuals engaged in a range of smuggling, and victims of exploitation. The core issue, however, is why there’s so much illegal migration in Greece.

One reason is geography. Greece’s location is conducive to trafficking of people seeking to escape poverty or oppressive regimes or both. Another is that Greece has been late in forming a comprehensive migration policy that would enable legal and flexible work migration, so successive governments managed the problem through repeated regularization/amnesty programs and police sweeps leading to mass deportations. Finally, there has been so much irregula migration because there was “room” and an overall culture of tolerance in the Greek economy for informal employment.

The Bank of Greece estimates the country’s informal economy at thirty per cent of the legal economy; some place this figure higher than the central bank’s official estimate, claiming it is higher than thirty-five per cent. According to a 2010 OECD report, roughly half of all migrants in Greece, legal or not, are employed informally, in undeclared jobs. Employers’ willingness to cut costs by hiring off the books has created a job market that allows workers without legal papers to remain in the country. In other words, irregular migration is fostered by the demand of family-run or small business for very cheap labor that allows them to keep production costs low.

But this reality has a high cost. The cost goes far beyond the lost contributions to social insurance funds; it has negative implications for the country’s culture of job security and respect for basic workers’ rights, regardless of whether these workers are Greek or foreign.

Illegal migration is not just a Greek characteristic; according to Migration Policy Group data, there are at least twelve million undocumented migrants in the U.S. alone. Given that irregular migration is so widespread, it is worth looking at ways to limit and manage it. However, for the past two decades the debate in Greece has focused on border security; it is only recently that important issues such as assimilation and second-generation migrants have been added to this debate. There has only been a limited public debate on the type of proactive migration policy that Greece needs in order to meet immediate and future growth needs and attract the human resources with the requisite skills. The debate on how to regularize and improve the integration of those migrants already in the country while also averting undesired migration, has been equally limited.

The third increasingly widespread myth is that the economic crisis will naturally lead to a resolution of some of the existing difficulties. In effect, there is a growing number of stories in the media on rapid decline in steady employment among migrant populations in Greece. Male migrants working in sectors like construction where activity has ground to a halt are among the hardest hit by the economic crisis; female migrants working as household help have also been hit as households cut back on expenses. Migrants’ wages have been declining since the autumn of 2009, while reduced work and pay has meant that the number of migrants who meet criteria for maintaining legal status has also declined.

Less work and less money has created a dilemma for migrants: should they stay and try to adapt to the new conditions or should they leave either to return home or further immigrate elsewhere? The response has been mixed. Proximity has made it easier for Albanians in construction or agriculture to return to Albania temporarily and travel back-and-forth for seasonal work like olive gathering. Bulgarians and Romanians seem inclined to return to their respective countries or migrate elsewhere in the European Union, while Asian migrants also tend towards seeking work in other EU countries.

Although some ten percent of migrants have left, there are also those who do not wish to leave as they have put down roots. Moreover, migrating further on or back and forth from their home country is not an easy option for undocumented migrants who become ‘trapped’ in the country as border control becomes more restrictive.

In these circumstances, it becomes likely that migrants will be victim to even greater exploitation with further reductions in wages and more off-the-books employment. As fewer migrants will be able to meet the criteria for legal residence, migrants with families will be forced out, leaving behind single male migrants. Demographically, this would increase social imbalances as integration would be limited and social cohesion curtailed, pushing migrants further into ghettoization. The challenges raised by such developments will certainly not solve issues linked to migration management in Greece.

In order to exit the current recession, the Greek economy will have to undergo radical changes. To trigger sustainable growth and prosperity,the country must mobilize all of its human resources–and migrants are a valuable part of this capital. This means that any discussion on Greece’s migration policy must focus on how the Greek economy can rebound and who is needed so as to achieve this.

Help (not) wanted
Unemployment figures in the Eurozone headed for record levels in October, with some 16.3 million unemployed across the euro countries, according to Eurostat. The figure itself is astounding–and more than the population of countries like Greece–as it represents ten per cent of the labor force in the eurozone.

In Greece, where unemployment hit a record 18.4 per cent in August–a month where seasonal employment in tourism usually pushes jobless figures down–the outlook is grim as the country heads deeper into recession. Indeed, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s latest projections for Europe, but especially Greece are grim. Unemployment could reach 18.5 per cent–a little lower than Spain’s 22 per cent forecast, but nearly double the eurozone average. These figures, of course, only take into account the registered unemployed and not workers owed several months pay (a growing phenomenon over the past year) or those ineligible for unemployment benefits. Joblessness, of course, feeds into the vicious cycle of recession as the state is forced to pay out more in benefits and social insurance funds lose out on contributions.