Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s innovative surge has brought him face to face with a range of decisions. Having rejected from the start his predecessors practice of avoiding any confrontation with the Kemalist brass by bowing to often humiliating conditions for cohabitation. Erdogan opted to take on the military and restore religion as an element on the Turkish political scene.

Reuniting a divided Turkey is a Herculean task  that can only be achieved through Turkish nationalism. It’s an ideology rooted in the nationalist principles outlined by Ziya Gökalp, an intellectual and political activist who believed that Turkey’s stood on the triple pillars of “Turkish”, Islam, and Western orientation. Erdogan is now restoring the Islamic pillar.

In his effort to do this, Erdogan has opened several fronts in tandem to his clash with the Turkish military. Knowing that Turkey’s relations with the Arab states and Turkish Muslims was being tested by its cooperation with Israel, he opted for a confrontation with Israel without realizing the multi-faceted consequences. As a result of its confrontation with Tel Aviv over the Mavi Marmara–a Turkish ship which Israeli commandos boarded in a deadly raid to prevent it from reaching Gaza as part of an aid flotilla–Ankara fell out of favor with Washington. Alliances between pro-Israeli groups and Turkish interests unraveled almost immediately while the U.S. press suddenly remembered past Turkish human rights violations. Now, as Cyprus and Israel move towards joint exploration of natural gas reserves, Turkey finds little sympathy in Washington for its objections.

Erdogan decision for involvement in the Middle East came at a problematic time. Syria, with whom Turkey maintained friendly relations, was embroiled in a number of uprisings, while Erdogan’s stance on a Libyan intervention did not earn him too many kudos among Nato. The arrogant dismissal of Turkish Cypriot protests with the rejoinder that Turkey has its own interests on Cyprus beyond the protection of its minority, also exposed him at the international level.

Continued Turkish provocations in the Aegean and the insistence on adhering to the Denktash line that intercommunal talks offer nothing but problems for Turkey, can be summed up with in the stance taken by Erdogan’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davuto lu, in an interview with the Greek daily Kathimerini in which he displayed a familiar evasiveness by sidestepping questions on Turkish air violations by advising his interviewer that he should not consider all of the Aegean air space as Greek. With the exceptions of the Aegean and the remote island of Kastellorizo, the Turkish foreign minister acts as if he’s unaware of international treaties.

But what are Erdogan’s priorities today? Perhaps disengagement from Cyprus which prevents the European Union from moving ahead with Turkish accession talks. Recent elections on Cyprus resulted in a Parliament with fewer intransigents, thus bolstering the Christofias line. However, the Turkish side remains intransigent on the issues of territory and removal of Turkish troops. Will Erdogan’s renewed strength from the June 12 elections allow him to move ahead with his policies, including constitutional reform? These developments may offer Greece and Cyprus important opportunities for negotiation on vital foreign policy issues.